Local Government and the Implementation of Alabama'S Economic Development Policy

Abstract

Political power affects not only the outcome (success or failure) of policy implementation, but also the design of structures used to deliver the policy. Beginning with the premise that the social construction of reality shapes the way policy recipients are perceived as well as the costs and benefits imposed upon them, we explore the effects of political power on the delivery of benefits to advantaged populations. More specifically, we examine the impact of local, or sub-state, government in shaping state economic development policy. To empirically probe the effects of power, we have chosen the case of Honda's investment in Alabama in 1999. We reach two conclusions. First, clarity of objectives is not detrimental to effective implementation. Second, implementation structures may be designed with fuzzy objectives and questionable linkages to outcomes in order to secure the highest level of support. Bureaucratic discretion is not simply a function of issues or need for accountability, but also a function of the incentives derived by political power.