Simulation Models of Group Segregation

Abstract

This paper is concerned to illustrate a general theorem, that purely individual rational behaviour can produce aggregate social outcomes consistent with, perhaps even suggestive of, concerted collective action and discrimination. It is a formal, even formalistic, analysis and not the results of any empirical investigation, although these formal models are useful in understanding certain aspects of more complex social pro cesses. To focus the discussion, I draw upon two areas that have in fact been the subject of considerable empirical research: residential segrega tion between racial groups, and gender segregation in the occupational structure. I discuss a restricted class of phenomena, amenable to rational choice theory, to demonstrate how actions which are rational at the in dividual level produce aggregate outcomes far more extreme than anyone intended or desired. A major implication of the analysis is that in order to realise more optimal outcomes the private actions of in dividuals need to brought into harmony through coordinated and col lective action.