Democracy and Redistribution: The Role of Regime Revisited

Abstract

This study challenges a well-supported institutionalist theory in comparative politics that links democracy with higher levels of redistribution as well as studies that link authoritarianism with welfare state liberalization. Using pooled cross-sectional data for ten post-communist countries spanning twenty-five years and a dynamic model specification, the study shows that, contrary to what the institutionalist theory predicts, post-communist democratic governments redistribute about 0.6 percent less of their GDP on social protection in the short term and 1.3 percent less in the long term than post-communist autocrats do. However, consistent with the cultural legacies hypothesis, there are no differences when it comes to redistribution of life chances through health care and education. I attribute the finding that post-communist autocracies redistribute more via social spending and are reluctant to liberalize their welfare states to their need to maintain popular legitimacy in a region where citizens are accustomed to high levels of redistribution and popular protests often lead to regime turnover. I argue that post-communist democracies have other available mechanisms to maintain their legitimacy, namely, free and fair elections, while post-communist autocratic governments have to rely on redistribution to do so. The findings have implications for our understanding of authoritarian resilience in the region.