Affiliation:
1. Department of Political Science and Diplomacy, Myongji University
Abstract
This article examines whether and how economic slowdowns lead to military conflict. Although a weak economy (as reflected, for example, by high inflation and unemployment rates) has often been regarded as a cause of interstate conflict, this study proposes that worse economy, that is, a negative trend of growth rates, tends to make political leaders face domestic challenge from dissatisfied public and look for diversionary targets. In addition, it hypothesizes that economically troubled states will target their junior trade partners, which are less likely to retaliate harshly. The results, based on an analysis of directed dyads from 1950 to 2010, show that a state is more likely to initiate military conflict when economic growth slows. When the initiator is an autocracy and the target is a democracy, this aggression is likely directed toward a vulnerable trade partner. However, a potential initiator’s political unrest does not increase the tendency to target a junior economic partner. These findings suggest that an autocracy’s slowing economy can threaten a politically dissimilar and economically dependent state, and that political and economic unrest have different effects on diversionary conflict as these factors interact with the domestic and international environments. Given our globalized economy and the current erosion of democracy worldwide, we could experience more frequent conflicts between economically troubled autocracies and their junior trade partners.
Funder
National Research Foundation of Korea
Subject
Political Science and International Relations,Safety Research,Sociology and Political Science
Cited by
1 articles.
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