Threatened Leadership and Intergroup Conflicts

Abstract

Three simulation-experiments and one field-study among 29 Dutch labor Unions are reported in which is investigated the relation between the threat to a leadership position and the initiation of conflicts with an outgroup. It is found in all the studies that leaders who are threatened in the maintenance of their positions are more likely to start a conflict with another group in order to have better chances for re-election, whereas non-threatened leaders tend to opt for intergroup cooperation. This behaviour seems to be very instrumental (subjects take into consideration the chance of winning the conflict), even though most subjects deny that they are preoccupied with holding on to their leadership positions. The practical conclusion is (with the assumption that it is preferable in the interest of a safe world to have less conflicts between groups): to appoint the most influential leaders in our society for a certain limited period of time (e. g. 5 years) during which they would be very certain of the maintenance of their position, but who would be without a chance of re-election.