Choice of product quality in supply chain of live-streaming e-commerce under different power structures

Abstract

Product quality has become an important factor affecting consumer demand and the sustainable and stable development of the live-streaming e-commerce supply chain. In this article, two types of Stackelberg game of manufacturer-led or streamer-led and centralized decision game models are constructed to explore the impact of streamer commission proportion and different power structures on product quality decision-making of live-streaming e-commerce supply chain. The results show that (1) product quality decreases with the increase of streamer commission proportion under streamer’s dominant power structure and manufacturer’s dominant power structure, and product quality is not affected by streamer commission proportion under a centralized decision-making mode; (2) the product quality under the three power structures increases with the increase of quality sensitivity coefficient and decreases with the increase of quality-improvement cost coefficient; (3) comparatively speaking, the live-streaming under centralized decision-making mode has lower price and higher product quality, while the power structure dominated by manufacturers is unfavorable to the improvement of product quality. JEL Classification: C72, D21