The Executive Connection

Abstract

Comparative theories of legislatures have generally focused on the impact of electoral system-generated incentives on party discipline. While hypotheses advanced by this literature can explain cross-national variation in discipline, they fail to explain variation within one and the same country. This work explains the impressive cross-party and within-party variation in discipline observed in Brazil's first democracy (1946-64). We argue that party discipline was above all a function of presidents' legislative coalition-building strategies based on the dispensation of patronage to parties. One main consequence of these strategies was the creation of two factions within each party: one pro-presidential, the other anti-presidential. The relative size of each faction is assumed to affect discipline. Econometric analysis of 982 roll calls demonstrates that the key determinants of the discipline of the largest parties were the extent of budgetary resources channeled to them by presidents and the lapsing of the president's term.