Institutional, Economic, or Solidaristic? Assessing Explanations for Unionization Across Affluent Democracies

Abstract

This study assesses three explanations for cross-national differences in unionization: Western’s (1997) institutional model, economic explanations based on the business cycle or globalization, and Hechter’s (2004) solidaristic theory. This study features a multilevel analysis of employed workers with the late 1990s World Values surveys of 18 affluent democracies. The analyses generally support the institutional model. Left parties and ghent systems remain influential, though ghent is less robust. Neo-corporatism and wage coordination are insignificant whereas workplace access is the more salient indicator of centralization. Beyond Western’s model, right cabinet significantly weakens unionization. Refuting economic explanations, inflation, unemployment, and economic growth, as well as international trade and investment, do not influence unionization. Consistent with Hechter’s claims, the welfare state reduces unionization but, contradicting his claims, immigration does not undermine unions. Ultimately, this study supports a revised institutional model that supplements Western’s model with right cabinet and the welfare state.