Pluralism, Heterodoxy, and the Rhetoric of Distinction

Abstract

The paper addresses the arguments made by Frederic Lee on heterodoxy and pluralism. It argues that the definitions of mainstream and heterodox, and consequently the differences between them, are highly problematic. Specifically it challenges Lee’s characterizations of mainstream and heterodox economics as noncomparable. Attempts to contrast them starkly are part of a rhetoric of distinction which may be problematic. Thus, Lee’s concept of intellectual pluralism may be weaker than it seems, because it is based on distinction and its tolerance, rather than an embrace of diversity. Further, both theoretical and intellectual pluralism may be based on wider epistemological and ontological grounds and thus Lee’s distinction between them may also be problematic. Sheila Dow’s structured pluralism may be a more productive way of embracing difference. JEL classification: B40, B5