From Bosnia to Sarajevo

Abstract

This paper undertakes a comparative case study of the relationship between the onset of interstate crises and the incidence of war. Findings obtained from several different studies are integrated and extended into an analysis of changes in the major-power subsystem between the Bosnian Crisis of 1908-1909 (which was resolved without war) and the Sarajevo Crisis of 1914 (which escalated into the First World War). The outcomes of these crises are examined in the context of the changing pattern of major-power alliances, the distribution and the shift in distribution of major-power capabilities, and the pre-1914 arms race. The author finds a transformation in the major-power subsystem between 1905-1910 which significantly altered the existing European balance of power in favor of the Triple Entente. During the Sarajevo Crisis, the behavior of the decision makers on both sides reflected that transformation. The implications of these findings for conflict theory are summarized.