Arms and Aggression in the Middle East, 1948-1991

Abstract

In a 1995 article in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Kinsella and Tillema argued that, between 1948 and 1991, American arms transfers to Israel exercised a restraining influence on both Israel and its Arab rivals, whereas Soviet transfers to Egypt and Syria tended to destabilize the region. This article reexamines Kinsella and Tillema's Poisson results by applying a more sophisticated statistical method to their data set. Using a multiplicative Poisson model that allows for variation in the coefficients depending on a metrical reference variable, the authors show how the impact of superpower activity on Middle Eastern interventions has changed with the influx of weaponry. They confirm that U.S. arms transfers decreased the likelihood of military intervention in the region, whereas Soviet supplies did not affect it. Contrary to Kinsella and Tillema, however, the authors show that the stabilizing effect of arms transfers clearly decreases with the total amount of armaments supplied to the region.