TRACKS: Bailouts and Unwanted Coordination-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

TRACKS: Bailouts and Unwanted Coordination

Published:2006-01 Issue:1 Volume:21 Page:109-117
ISSN:0148-558X
Container-title:Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance
language:en
Short-container-title:Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance

Author:

Arya Anil¹,Glover Jonathan²

Affiliation:

1. Ohio State University

2. Carnegie Mellon University

Abstract

This paper demonstrates that ex post bailouts prompted by a noncontractible signal of output can lead to ex ante tacit collusion. The possibility of being bailed out whenever they fail can decrease the incentives of agents to do a good job in the first place.

Publisher

SAGE Publications

Subject

Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous),Finance,Accounting

Link

http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0148558X0602100107

Reference9 articles.

1. A Simple Forecasting Mechanism for Moral Hazard Settings

2. Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard

3. Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents

4. Resolving Double Moral Hazard Problems with Buyout Agreements

5. Sourcing with Unverifiable Performance Information

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