Evaluating electoral reforms and its consequences in Indonesia and Thailand (2000–2023)

Abstract

This article investigates electoral reforms in Indonesia and Thailand in the 21st century, highlighting important dimensions of the electoral changes and their consequences in disproportionality and the effective number of parties. In the first stage, we identify electoral changes and the ideal goals of electoral reform. Second, we compare each election's results by calculating disproportional results and the effective number of parties, followed by in-depth interviews with key stakeholders (N = 8) to uncover the evaluation and recommendation for a better future of the electoral system in both countries. The analysis reveals the government's motivation behind the electoral system chosen. In Indonesia, the reforms addressed realising the limited pluralism party system raised a thorny debate among small to medium parties about rescuing their seats in parliament. Otherwise, the Thai government accommodates small parties by waiving the electoral threshold. We identify that different people in positions of power in each country cause different ideal goals. This research contributes to developing an understanding that elite motivation outweighs the public good in designing electoral reform. While in Thailand the control to determine which electoral system is chosen seems more centralised by the junta military, the shift of the electoral system in Indonesia is strongly motivated by political actors in order to gain their pragmatic interests.