Candidate entry in a non-partisan context: Evidence from Indonesia

Abstract

Why do candidates enter an electoral contest? The Rational Model of Candidate Entry offers a parsimonious explanation focusing on the probability of victory, the benefit of holding office, as well as campaign costs. Quality challengers enter when there is a high probability of victory, while long-shot races attract amateurs. In most contexts, the presence of parties makes it difficult to disentangle candidate decisions from organizational recruitment strategies. To test the basic assumptions of the Rational Model of Candidate Entry, this Research Note examines candidate entry decisions in Indonesia's Regional Representative Council ( Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD), the world's largest elected non-partisan assembly. An analysis of constituency-level candidate lists in all four DPD elections indicates that entry decisions are affected by the perceived probability of victory, with fewer candidates entering in constituencies with a more concentrated vote in the previous election. Potentially winnable DPD races attract a greater number of experienced challengers, partisan amateurs, and non-partisan amateurs. Only the number of non-partisan amateur candidates consistently correlates with socio-demographic variables, further underlining the importance of electoral context for ambitious, politically savvy elites. The findings affirm the broad applicability of the Rational Model and spotlight Indonesia's often-overlooked DPD as a venue of strategic behaviour.