The perils of plurality rule and the major(itarian) effect of cabinet composition on human rights in presidential democracies

Abstract

I argue that when presidents are able (or forced) to cobble together broad-based coalitions to win an absolute majority, their administrations are less likely (and less able) to violate human rights, in comparison to presidential administrations whose victories are the result of a narrow plurality. Consistent with this argument, I find cabinets comprised of a higher percentage of individuals from parties other than that of the president to be associated with greater government respect for human rights. Additionally, I find that in the years after a presidential election won by an absolute majority, states are more likely to experience an increase in government respect for human rights, in comparison to the years after a presidential election won by a mere plurality. Utilizing an original dataset of cabinet composition for 35 presidential democracies spanning from 2001 to 2011, this study concludes that it may prudent for non-majoritarian systems to consider adopting a mandatory majority rule so to encourage the types of conciliatory alliances that appear to promote high human rights respect.