Author:
Siegal Gil,Mello Michelle M.,Studdert David M.
Abstract
Policy debates over medical malpractice in the United States involve a complex amalgam of legal doctrine, public demands to address the problem of medical errors, and the interests of various stakeholder groups. Most parties can agree, however, that the current system for compensating medical injury performs poorly. It falls short of achieving its two main goals: compensation and deterrence. The current system of tort liability is “neither sensitive nor specific in its distribution of compensation:” the vast majority of patients injured by negligent medical care do not receive compensation, yet the system compensates some cases that do not appear to involve negligence. Sometimes, it awards more in noneconomic damages than seems reasonable to many observers. Ultimately, tort liability appears to do little to improve health care quality and safety, yet it spurs costly defensive medicine. Physicians and health care organizations face burdensome insurance and legal costs, leading some to threaten to curtail their services. These concerns about the burden of medical injury and the malpractice “crisis” have sharpened calls for reform.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Law,General Medicine,Health (social science)
Cited by
15 articles.
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