Military Cohesion and Regime Maintenance

Abstract

Why are certain militaries in authoritarian regimes more effective in carrying out the task of regime maintenance than others? This is the central question of this article, which explains the Chinese and Indonesian militaries’differing responses to government orders to suppress the Tiananmen Square demonstrations of 1989 and the protests prior to the downfall of Indonesian President Suharto in 1998. The article argues that the varying level of effectiveness in dealing with protestors is attributable to how governments employ institutional controls or “stick” mechanisms and the effect these controls have on military organizational cohesion. Specifically, the article notes that the efficacy of a regime's institutional controls does not just center on having mechanisms to monitor, prevent, and punish malfeasance within the military. Instead, militaries are likely to be successful in suppressing demonstrations if authoritarian leaders do not implement policies that undermine the organizational integrity of the armed forces.