Building a National Army: The Paradoxes of Civil–Military Relations in Ethiopia

Abstract

The nature of civil–military relations in postconflict states where rebel groups won a civil war and built the national army anew is underappreciated and undertheorized. Drawing from a comprehensive analysis of Ethiopia’s experience of building a national army from 1991 to 2018 as a case study, this article attempts to fill this gap. The article argues that the rebel-origin of the regime and the army, the ideology underpinning the regime, and its aspiration to emerge as a hegemonic political force determine the nature of civil–military relations in a postconflict state where the rebel won the war. The article adopts a qualitative case study methodology and relies on data collected through key-informant interviews, government archives, and extensive survey of the state-owned daily newspaper, Addis Zemen. The article contributes to the body of knowledge on civil–military relations in postconflict states in general, and the study of civil–military relations in Africa in particular.