Domestic Lobbying for External Change: Textile Sector and Pakistan’s Entry into Generalised System of Preferences Plus

Abstract

How do export-oriented factions influence trade policy? Export-oriented industries have incentives to expand trade, as doing so results in greater market access and higher profits. To achieve higher trade, such industries lobby policymakers through associations and interest groups that vie for policy influence. This paper suggests that such organization allows exporters to lobby governments at both the domestic and international levels. Domestically, exporters can take vocal positions on policy and pressure the government into concessions. Externally, exporters can placate opposition to their proposals by engaging in diplomacy and negotiation to finalize agreements. This paper uses Pakistan’s quest for Generalised System of Preferences Plus status with the European Union (EU) as an illustration of this mechanism. Influential domestic factions in Pakistan’s textile sector stood to benefit from preferential trading with the EU, and they successfully lobbied for favorable change in the country’s domestic policy and external relations. Evidence for this argument is presented using archival newspaper research from 2009 to 2013.