Pragmatic Solidarism and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention

Abstract

The theory and practice of humanitarian intervention in the 1990s has produced a series of seemingly intractable dilemmas. Why do states act in some cases and not others? How are we to evaluate the legitimacy of particular acts? This article introduces a new perspective on these questions informed by a combination of pragmatism and solidarism. It argues that although the search for criteria that may be used to judge the legitimacy and efficacy of humanitarian intervention may be a futile one, it is possible to think about a politics of legitimate humanitarian intervention. Such a politics may be based on three key insights drawn from pragmatism: the dialogic construction of moral knowledge, the fallibility of knowledge, and the priority of democracy over philosophy. The article discusses how such a pragmatic solidarism may be used to interrogate the quest for legitimising criteria and to build a new politics of humanitarian intervention.