Affiliation:
1. School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry, The University of Queensland, Australia
Abstract
An intractable problem that characterizes the contemporary philosophical discussion of emotion is whether emotions are fundamentally cognitive or noncognitive. In this article, I will establish that this problem arises from the influence of an underlying philosophical anthropology that entails a mind/body “split” ultimately inherited from Cartesianism, and further show that it can be fruitfully addressed by adopting a contemporary construal of the self and emotions derived from the philosophy of a key critic of Descartes’ dualism, Spinoza.
Subject
Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous),Experimental and Cognitive Psychology,Social Psychology
Cited by
7 articles.
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