Philosophical foundations of computer simulation validation

Abstract

Innovations in information technology (IT) have been responsible for the rapid growth of computer simulation, which in turn has encouraged IT innovation. However, there is a striking contrast between the technological sophistication that drives and is driven by computer simulation and the rudimentary, underdeveloped state of theory underpinning the simulation endeavor. This article attempts to provide computer simulation with a theoretical framework by the application of philosophy of science to simulation validation. The authors discuss the key elements of Popper’s theory of falsification and explore how simulation validation is in fact anchored to Popper’s theory. Moreover, this article suggests that a Popperian perspective encourages the review of a validated model’s continuing validity, thereby potentially leading to the construction of a new, improved model. Finally, we contrast Popper’s falsificationist philosophy of science with Quine’s philosophical system of holism and early-period Putnam’s scientific realism, both of which discourage the building of better models.