How Do Curbside Feedback Tactics Impact Households’ Recycling Performance? Evidence From Community Programs

Author:

McKie Erin C1ORCID,Chandrasekaran Aravind1ORCID,Venkataraman Sriram2

Affiliation:

1. Department of Operations and Business Analytics, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA

2. Department of Management Science, Moore School of Business, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC, USA

Abstract

Much of the responsibility for advancing the circular economy has been directed towards firms, yet many reuse opportunities can only be achieved through environmentally compliant, household-level recycling behaviors. In response, policymakers and recycling organizations are using a range of feedback mechanisms to promote household recycling that meets local quality standards. However, the effectiveness of these tactics remains unclear, and stakeholders are divided on the appropriateness of their use. In this research, we examine the role of two popular feedback mechanisms—information-only and information-plus-penalty—in correcting households’ curbside recycling behaviors. With information-only feedback, households are provided with best practices for recycling and are not penalized for their errors. With information-plus-penalty feedback, households also receive information, but temporarily forfeit their recycling services. While previous studies have explored the use of information and penalties as feedback mechanisms to guide behavioral changes, there is mixed evidence of their effectiveness, particularly in the recycling context. We address this research gap by analyzing unique data collected from a 2019 curbside auditing effort that occurred in a large, Mid-Western city. Our analysis leverages econometric methods, and recycling feedback and performance data from 25,359 audits across 11,899 households and 15 recycling routes. We find that information-only feedback mechanisms, while preferred by some stakeholders, are not associated with improvements in recycling quality (measured using household contamination rates). By contrast, our results indicate that punitive mechanisms (i.e., information-plus-penalty) involving cart refusals are associated with significant reductions in contamination rates: that is, households that receive punitive feedback reduce their contamination rate severity by 59%, and are 75% less likely to commit a violation in the future. More importantly, we do not find evidence that punitive feedback mechanisms generally discourage households’ participation in recycling programs (measured using future set out rates). Our study informs sustainable operations management literature by investigating how curbside feedback mechanisms, with differing levels of severity, influence critical dimensions of households’ recycling performance (i.e., recycling quality and participation). We also inform policymakers on how curbside feedback mechanisms can be more effectively leveraged to enhance opportunities for material reuse.

Publisher

SAGE Publications

Cited by 2 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献 订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

同舟云学术

1.学者识别学者识别

2.学术分析学术分析

3.人才评估人才评估

"同舟云学术"是以全球学者为主线,采集、加工和组织学术论文而形成的新型学术文献查询和分析系统,可以对全球学者进行文献检索和人才价值评估。用户可以通过关注某些学科领域的顶尖人物而持续追踪该领域的学科进展和研究前沿。经过近期的数据扩容,当前同舟云学术共收录了国内外主流学术期刊6万余种,收集的期刊论文及会议论文总量共计约1.5亿篇,并以每天添加12000余篇中外论文的速度递增。我们也可以为用户提供个性化、定制化的学者数据。欢迎来电咨询!咨询电话:010-8811{复制后删除}0370

www.globalauthorid.com

TOP

Copyright © 2019-2024 北京同舟云网络信息技术有限公司
京公网安备11010802033243号  京ICP备18003416号-3