Financing and Farm-Gate Pricing Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives With Cash-Constrained Farmers

Abstract

Equity investment in agricultural cooperatives (co-ops) is typically limited to farmer-members; yet farmers are usually cash-constrained. In addition to the common stock that is held by farmer-members, many co-ops are changing their financial structure by raising equity from external investors. This helps co-ops to collect capital, but also brings to the fore the conflicting benefits of farmers and external investors. In this paper, we develop a two-stage game-theoretic model to examine a start-up co-op’s farm-gate pricing and financing strategies, considering two types of external fund: preferred stock that bears a fixed return rate and outside stock that shares the net profit (in proportion to equity) with common stock. We characterize the co-op’s strategies in different scenarios and generate the following insights. First, while both types of external equity outperform the case with common stock only, the preferred stock generally outperforms outside stock due to its lower financial cost, higher tolerance for fund size limits, and flexibility in setting farm-gate prices. However, outside stock can outperform preferred stock if it allows a higher fund size limit. Second, the co-op’s financial strategy exhibits a similar structure in equilibrium regardless of whether it is preferred stock or outside stock, despite their distinct financial terms. Finally, farm-gate pricing has a unique role in co-ops affecting the returns to farmers and external investors, which also highlights the conflicting roles of farmers as both patrons and investors when external equity is used.