Financing Supplier Through Retailer’s Credit

Abstract

This study examines two retailer-initiated pre-shipment financing programs to assist capital-constrained suppliers in securing external funds for production. The first program is retailer-sponsored financing (RSF), an emerging practice in developing economies. Under RSF, the retailer commits to sharing the loan repayment obligation with the supplier by agreeing to pay up to a specific portion of the supplier’s bank loan repayment. The second program is advance payment (AP), a common payment arrangement wherein the retailer pays a part of the wholesale amount upfront to support the supplier’s production costs. We analyze a supply chain comprising a supplier and retailer. The retailer must choose between offering RSF, AP, or neither. Without RSF or AP, the supplier must opt for bank-direct financing when it is short of funds and bear the full responsibility of repaying the loan principal and interest. Our findings reveal a divergence in supplier and retailer preferences. Specifically, the supplier favors RSF as it not only lowers the marginal production cost but also permits the supplier to charge a higher risk premium to the retailer compared to AP. Conversely, the retailer prefers AP primarily due to the latter reason. Our research underscores the significance of RSF as a distinct financing alternative, enabling retailers to aid a supplier segment that cannot rely solely on AP. RSF also proves to be advantageous for banks by expanding their supplier clientele and boosting their lending volume. Interestingly, the supplier’s and retailer’s bankruptcy risks tend to have opposite impacts on the value of RSF.