The Culture of Objectivity: Quantification, Uncertainty, and the Evaluation of Risk at NASA

Abstract

For over three decades social studies of science have investigated ‘objectivity’ as a central, socially constructed assumption in scientific and engineering work. This literature has seldom been utilized in the study of organizations despite the fact that knowledge production and knowledge use in scientific and engineering organizations are presumed to be objective or independent of individual and social influences. In this article, the social studies of science literature as it conceptualizes and understands objectivity is reviewed. An analysis of the data on decision-making at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) during the years preceding the explosion of Challenger is carried out using concepts from this literature. Data on decision-making at NASA during the years preceding the explosion of Columbia are also analyzed. It is shown that the culture of objectivity at NASA interacted with time pressures to produce a misunderstanding of flight risk. This misunderstanding resulted from two general aspects of NASA’s culture: (i) an over-confidence in quantitative data went hand-in-hand with a marginalization of nonquantifiable data, leading to an insensitivity to uncertainty and a loss of organizational memory; and (ii) problem definition and solution creation were constructed as if they were independent of organizational goals, resulting in an inaccurate estimation of risk.