Information Exchange With Shared Databases as a Social Dilemma

Abstract

When group members exchange information via shared databases people are often reluctant to contribute information they possess. This is explained by the fact that this kind of information exchange represents a social dilemma. This article applies critical concepts of dilemma theory to the interpretation of database information exchange as a social dilemma and tests their effects experimentally. A prestudy with the experimental task ensures that people perceive database information exchange as a social dilemma, and two experiments investigate three factors influencing this dilemma: (a) a person’s meta-knowledge about the importance of his information for the other group members, (b) a use-related bonus system that rewards contribution of important information, and (c) costs incurred by the contribution of important or less important information. As dependent variables people’s contribution behavior as well as their subjective perception of the dilemma structure are considered. The results show that metaknowledge enhances the quality of contributions, especially in combination with a use-related bonus system, whereas increased contribution costs influence the contribution behavior negatively.