Affiliation:
1. University of Virginia,
Abstract
Formal political institutions have been assigned two roles in democratization theorizing: as contingent effects of strategic interaction and as predictable bases for democratic consolidation. These roles might be reconciled if we assume that institutions become persistent once in place. But patterns of behavior surrounding these institutions do not appear to conform to the expectations of path dependency or comparable frameworks: while unchallenged in some cases, these institutions are repeatedly contested and often enough revised in others. This is true even of ‘low stakes’ institutional designs. Consequently, groups often perceive institutional designs not as ‘locked in’ and instead as malleable over even a few years. Codified political institutions therefore appear unable to generate the reduced risks - in effect, the credible commitments - which Adam Przeworski’s argument about democratic consolidation requires. This conclusion suggests that consolidation may result from reductions in political risks caused by non-institutional factors. It also has implications for diverse arguments which assume stability or predictability in formal institutions.
Subject
Sociology and Political Science
Cited by
92 articles.
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