1. To me, heuristic relativism (or, more commonly, “methodological relativism”) risks smuggling normativity in the back door, just as much as “methodological realism” would. Take, for example, the ambiguous, if not exaggerated, claim that “[a]s we come to recognize the conventional and artifactual status of our forms of knowing, we put ourselves in a position to realize that it is ourselves and not reality that is responsible for what we know” (Shapin S., Schaffer S., Leviathan and the air-pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the experimental life (Princeton, 1985), 344). An heuristic agnostic would say “it is ourselves, and sometimes, presumably (exactly when, we do not know) the world out there, that is (or are) responsible (to what degrees, respectively, we also do not know) for what we know”. In other words, for the purposes of epistemological analysis, we need to remain heuristically agnostic as to where nature's causal responsibility ends and our moral, as well as causal responsibility begins.