Maternal and paternal functions in the formation of subjectivity: Kristeva and Lacan

Abstract

The Kristeva–Lacan relationship has been a difficult one, with commentators tending to either collapse the former into the latter or insist on an absolute division wherein Kristeva emphasizes the maternal function over Lacan’s privileging of the symbolic paternal law. In contrast, I argue that Kristeva’s actual position regarding Lacan and, by extension, the semiotic–symbolic relation is far more complicated than even her defenders often realize, before turning to the role(s) that the paternal function play(s) in Lacan’s analysis of the psyche’s movement into the symbolic to show that nevertheless Kristeva’s critique is based on a number of key misreadings regarding Lacan’s conception of (1) the paternal function, (2) the maternal–paternal relation and (3) the movement from the pre-symbolic to the symbolic. Rather than operating through a straightforward binary opposition between a maternal and a (privileged, repressive) paternal function, Lacan actually claims, in a similar vein to Kristeva, that the transmission of the symbolic law occurs through a complex and heterogeneous process wherein both the maternal and paternal functions are multiple and bound to and expressive of the other. This sheds light on the Kristeva–Lacan relationship, defends Lacan against the charge that he affirms a straightforward logic of patriarchy, identifies the multidimensionality inherent in both Kristeva’s and Lacan’s notions of the maternal and paternal functions and shows how the intertwinement of both functions aids the formation of subjectivity generally and the child’s symbolic acquisition specifically.