The Lebensform as organism: Clarifying the limits of immanent critique

Abstract

In this article, I argue for the necessary organicism of immanent critique and the resulting limits and applicability of immanent critique as elaborated in Rahel Jaeggi’s account of Lebensformen. Through a historical review of the problem of natural purposiveness between Kant, Schelling and Hegel, I show that the notion of immanent critique that Hegel produced, and Jaeggi adopts, was an intrinsically organic notion. With this conceptual connection, I demonstrate that Jaeggi’s elaboration of Lebensformen is consistent with this organicism, but also explicate how this property limits critique where the criterion is the long-term stability of Lebensformen. Aligning the organicism of immanent critique with similar projects of social criticism citing the organic, namely eco-Marxism and cybernetics, I show that the cases of capitalism and bureaucracy are not practically vulnerable to immanent critique without supplement. I conclude by suggesting further research requires articulating a hybrid external-immanent form of criticism.