Constraining Denaturalization

Abstract

Citizenship has been treated, since World War II, as a robust political and legal status. Recent political events have prompted the reassessment of the conditions under which it can be justly removed, however. Using the lens of democratic theory, I consider one particular instance of denationalization, namely, the withdrawal of citizenship from naturalized citizens when the granting state believes that the applicant ‘misrepresented’ themselves, that is, engaged in some form of deception, during the process of naturalization. There is an intuitive plausibility to the thought that if an applicant for citizenship lies or fails to provide all of the requested information, she should be denied citizenship. It seems equally plausible that, if citizenship status is nevertheless granted under these conditions, it can be permissibly removed. However, I argue that this conclusion is too quick: to be permissible, denaturalization procedures must be significantly constrained, in the ways that I outline.