Limited Communitarianism and the Merit of Afro-communitarian Rejectionism

Abstract

Limited communitarianism is presented as an alternative to classical communitarianism in African philosophy. Bernard Matolino, the   proponent of this view, argues that personhood can be attained with the constitutive features of the self leading the process, as against  the historical, classical communitarian view that prioritises the sociality of the self. He posits that it is a personhood conceived through  such view as limited communitarianism that can guarantee individual rights and prioritises the claims of the individual in African  philosophy. Matolino’s claim is grounded on the view that Afro-communitarianism, as presented in the classical account such as the  radical and moderate communitarianism of Menkiti and Gyekye, respectively, emphasises community essence in African philosophy and   hinders the expression of rights. The claim of the classical view informs the nudge to question the relevance and compatibility of Afro- communitarianism with the complex, multicultural modern African societies. As a result, limited communitarianism rejects the  mechanism of Afrocommunitarianism – essentialism. While limited communitarianism appears a rejection of what is known as Afro- communitarianism, which has earned it noncommunitarian labels such as being liberal and individualist, I argue that it is simply a well- argued form of moderate communitarianism that avoids the conundrum of community.