South Korean Public's Threat Perception of North Korea and Support for the US Extended Deterrence

Abstract

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol's statement on nuclear acquisition resonates throughout the United States, raising speculations about his intent. Although the U.S. has made strides to reassure South Korea by establishing the Nuclear Consultative Group in 2023, the South Korean public's heightened threat perception of North Korea has neither been assuaged nor translated into support for the U.S. extended deterrence. This situation contradicts existing literature, which posits that a state's restraint on nuclear armament can be attributed to the security guarantee provided by its nuclear ally. To resolve this puzzle, this study explores the nature of the South Korean public's threat perception and the factors determining its support for the U.S. extended deterrence. Empirical analyses demonstrate that South Korean public's threat perception of North Korea is substantially high in both progressive and conservative blocs. However, South Koreans would rather develop their own nuclear weapon than rely on extended deterrence.