WHAT DOES EMOTION TEACH US ABOUT SELF-DECEPTION? AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE IN SUPPORT OF NON-INTENTIONALISM

Author:

Lauria Federico1,Preissmann Delphine2

Affiliation:

1. CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND SOCIETY, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK/SWISS CENTER FOR AFFECTIVE SCIENCES, UNIVERSITY OF GENEVA

2. CENTER FOR PSYCHIATRIC NEUROSCIENCE, DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, LAUSANNE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, PRILLY, SWITZERLAND

Abstract

Intuitively, affect plays an indispensable role in self-deception’s dynamic. Call this view “affectivism.” Investigating affectivism matters, as affectivists argue that this conception favours the non-intentionalist approach to self-deception and offers a unified account of straight and twisted self-deception. However, this line of argument has not been scrutinized in detail, and there are reasons to doubt it. Does affectivism fulfill its promises of non-intentionalism and unity? We argue that it does, as long as affect’s role in self-deception lies in affective filters—that is, in evaluation of information in light of one’s concerns (the affective-filter view). We develop this conception by taking into consideration the underlying mechanisms governing self-deception, particularly the neurobiological mechanisms of somatic markers and dopamine regulation. Shifting the discussion to this level can fulfill the affectivist aspirations, as this approach clearly favours non-intentionalism and offers a unified account of self-deception. We support this claim by criticizing the main alternative affectivist account—namely, the views that self-deception functions to reduce anxiety or is motivated by anxiety. Describing self-deception’s dynamic does not require intention; affect is sufficient if we use the insights of neuroscience and the psychology of affective bias to examine this issue. In this way, affectivism can fulfill its promises

Publisher

Consortium Erudit

Subject

General Medicine

Reference64 articles.

1. Ansermet, François, and Pierre Magistretti, Biology of Freedom: Neural Plasticity, Experience, and the Unconscious, New York, Other Press, 2017.

2. Bach, Kent, “An Analysis of Self-Deception,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 41, no. 198, p. 1351-1370.

3. Barnes, Annette, Seeing through Self-Deception, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997.

4. Bayne, Tim, and Jordi Fernández (eds.), Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation, New York, Psychology Press, 2009.

5. Bechara, Antoine, “Deciding Advantageously Before Knowing the Advantageous Strategy,” Science, vol. 275.5304, 1997, p. 1293-1295.

Cited by 1 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献 订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. Petits arrangements avec soi-même;Cahiers de psychologie clinique;2024-01-09

同舟云学术

1.学者识别学者识别

2.学术分析学术分析

3.人才评估人才评估

"同舟云学术"是以全球学者为主线,采集、加工和组织学术论文而形成的新型学术文献查询和分析系统,可以对全球学者进行文献检索和人才价值评估。用户可以通过关注某些学科领域的顶尖人物而持续追踪该领域的学科进展和研究前沿。经过近期的数据扩容,当前同舟云学术共收录了国内外主流学术期刊6万余种,收集的期刊论文及会议论文总量共计约1.5亿篇,并以每天添加12000余篇中外论文的速度递增。我们也可以为用户提供个性化、定制化的学者数据。欢迎来电咨询!咨询电话:010-8811{复制后删除}0370

www.globalauthorid.com

TOP

Copyright © 2019-2024 北京同舟云网络信息技术有限公司
京公网安备11010802033243号  京ICP备18003416号-3