Author:
Kothari Pravesh,Singla Sahil,Mohan Divyarthi,Schvartzman Ariel,Weinberg S. Matthew
Cited by
12 articles.
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1. Generalization Guarantees for Multi-Item Profit Maximization: Pricing, Auctions, and Randomized Mechanisms;Operations Research;2023-12-13
2. Simultaneous Auctions are Approximately Revenue-Optimal for Subadditive Bidders;2023 IEEE 64th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS);2023-11-06
3. Simplicity in Auctions Revisited: The Primitive Complexity;Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation;2023-07-07
4. Fine-Grained Buy-Many Mechanisms Are Not Much Better Than Bundling;Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation;2023-07-07
5. Pricing ordered items;Proceedings of the 54th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing;2022-06-09