Avoiding Unintended Consequences: How Incentives Aid Information Provisioning in Bayesian Congestion Games
Author:
Affiliation:
1. University of California,Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering,Santa Barbara,CA
2. University of Colorado at Colorado Springs,Department of Computer Science
Publisher
IEEE
Link
http://xplorestaging.ieee.org/ielx7/9992315/9992317/09992777.pdf?arnumber=9992777
Reference31 articles.
1. A Semidefinite Approach to Information Design in Non-atomic Routing Games;zhu;CoRR,2020
2. Signaling in Bayesian Network Congestion Games: the Subtle Power of Symmetry;castiglioni,2020
3. Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games
4. Information Design for Regulating Traffic Flows under Uncertain Network State
5. A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
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