A Truthful Auction Mechanism for Mobile Crowd Sensing With Budget Constraint-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

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A Truthful Auction Mechanism for Mobile Crowd Sensing With Budget Constraint

Published:2019 Issue: Volume:7 Page:43933-43947
ISSN:2169-3536
Container-title:IEEE Access
language:
Short-container-title:IEEE Access

Author:

Liu Yuanni^ORCID,Xu Xiaodan,Pan Jianli,Zhang Jianhui,Zhao Guofeng

Funder

National Natural Science Foundation of China

China Scholarship Council

Chongqing Municipal Project

Publisher

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)

Subject

General Engineering,General Materials Science,General Computer Science

Link

http://xplorestaging.ieee.org/ielx7/6287639/8600701/08664672.pdf?arnumber=8664672

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2. Incentive Mechanism Design Toward a Win–Win Situation for Generative Art Trainers and Artists;IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems;2024

3. GRAIM: Game and Reverse Auction based Incentive Mechanism in Mobile Crowd Sensing;2023 19th International Conference on Mobility, Sensing and Networking (MSN);2023-12-14

4. e-Uber: A Crowdsourcing Platform for Electric Vehicle-based Ride- and Energy-sharing;2023 IEEE 20th International Conference on Mobile Ad Hoc and Smart Systems (MASS);2023-09-25

5. Participants recruitment for coverage maximization by mobility predicting in mobile crowd sensing;China Communications;2023-08

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