Author:
Liu Chenwei, ,Xiang Shuwen,Yang Yanlong,
Abstract
<abstract> <p>We define the Shapley allocation function (SAF) based on the characteristic function on a set of strategy profiles composed of infinite strategies to establish an <italic>n</italic>-person biform game model. It is the extension of biform games with finite strategies and scalar strategies. We prove the existence of Nash equilibria for this biform game with SAF, provided that the characteristic function satisfies the linear and semicontinuous conditions. We investigate the essential stability of Nash equilibria for biform games when characteristic functions are perturbed. We identify a residual dense subclass of the biform games whose Nash equilibria are all essential and deduce the existence of essential components of the Nash equilibrium set by proving the connectivity of its minimal essential set.</p> </abstract>
Publisher
American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS)
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