A novel evolution model to investigate the collaborative innovation mechanism of green intelligent building materials enterprises for construction 5.0

Author:

Hu Chengli1,Liu Ping2,Yang Hongtao3,Yin Shi4,Ullah Kifayat5

Affiliation:

1. School of Economics and Management, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin 150000, China

2. School of Economics and Management, Taishan University, Tai'an 271000, China

3. School of Business Administration, Huaqiao University, Quanzhou 362021, China

4. College of Economics and Management, Hebei Agricultural University, Baoding 071001, China

5. Department of Mathematics, Lahore Campus, Riphah International University, Lahore 54000, Pakistan

Abstract

<abstract> <p>Green intelligent building materials is an effective way for building materials industry to reduce carbon. However, a small amount of research and development (R&amp;D, unstable R&amp;D investment and imperfect collaborative innovation mode hinder the development of green intelligent building materials industry. However, few scholars study the development mechanism of green intelligent building materials industry from the perspective of industrial chain considering the above obstacles. In this study, the game models under market mechanism and government regulation were constructed to analyze the income distribution mechanism for the development mechanism of green intelligent building materials industry. Finally, the questionnaire method was used to discuss the game strategy of collaborative innovation behavior among agents. The results are as follows. In the game strategy selection of collaborative innovation behavior among green intelligent building materials, factors such as database marketing maturity, information flow and technology volume generated by collaborative innovation, technical benefit coefficient, social benefit coefficient and profit and loss barrier factors are conducive to the collaborative innovation behavior of green intelligent building materials. When the market mechanism fails, the incentive effect of cost subsidy adopted by the government is more efficient and fast, and the driving force of achievement reward is more lasting. The combination of the two incentives is the best. Moderate supervision and punishment lower than the free rider income can not ensure fair competition among green intelligent building materials enterprises. The punishment above the threshold can effectively restrain the negative impact of free rider income and prospect profit and loss. This study not only theoretically expands the development theory of digital industry from the perspective of industrial chain by considering the maturity factor of database, but also provides policy guidance for the development of green intelligent building materials industry in practice.</p> </abstract>

Publisher

American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS)

Subject

General Mathematics

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