Instrument Choice When Regulators and Firms Bargain-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Instrument Choice When Regulators and Firms Bargain

Published:1998-05 Issue:3 Volume:35 Page:225-241
ISSN:0095-0696
Container-title:Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
language:en
Short-container-title:Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Author:

Amacher Gregory S.,Malik Arun S.

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Subject

Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law,Economics and Econometrics

Reference21 articles.

1. Uncertainty and the choice of pollution control instruments;Adar;J. Environ. Econom. Management,1978

2. G. Amacher, A. Malik, Taxes versus standards when technology choice is endogenous, George Washington University, Center for Economic Research, Washington, DC, 1997

3. Bargaining in environmental regulation and the ideal regulator;Amacher;J. Environ. Econom. Management,1996

4. Monetary policy games and the role of private information;Canzoneri;Amer. Econom. Rev.,1985

5. Bargaining in pollution control;Downing;Policy Stud. J.,1983

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