Assessing Attribution and Credible Deterrence in Cyberspace

Abstract

This study examines the issues that states face in discerning actors within the realm of cyberspace, characterizing these challenges as akin to navigating the unregulated landscape. Lack of an effective attribution mechanism and a credible deterrence framework have significantly contributed to the volatility in cyber domain in contemporary times. This paper argues that states often accuse their adversaries of orchestrating cyber-attacks against them, yet they frequently fail to provide substantial evidence because actors behind attacks in cyberspace leverage the inherent anonymity of cyberspace to evade accountability, complicating the process of attribution even further. In addition, this study also underscores the importance of establishing an effective mechanism of deterrence in cyberspace to dissuade the attacking actors from engaging in malicious cyber activities. In line with this, this paper looks at the cyber space activities through novel perspective of no biasness, without subjectivity and tends to offer the answers of why attribution is problem, is there any possible solution to it in practice. Therefore, this study aims to highlight the ways to attribute the cyber-attacks and highlight the challenges to attribution, especially in the current scenario of states sponsoring indirectly cyber-attacks against many other states by outsourcing their aggressive designs in cyberspace to non-state actors.