Affiliation:
1. University of Trento via Inama Italy
Abstract
The Covid-19 emergency makes the seriousness of the unsolved political and economic issues that emerged during the European sovereign debt crisis even more evident. Today more than ever it is necessary to answer questions related to the fragility of the EMU architecture: why was the EMU created with an asymmetric structure? What was the role of EMU architecture and European policies during the crisis? Do EMU asymmetries threaten the survival of the Eurozone? The European integration process took place on the basis of a permissive consensus determined by the expectation of successful economic outcomes, without a true democratic legitimacy. Under such conditions, a fiscal and political union was not possible. The EMU proved to be a competitive arena, within which economic and political asymmetries were difficult to manage. An analysis of these asymmetries allows conclusions to be drawn regarding the risks associated with further economic and institutional integration.
Publisher
Ternopil National Economic University
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