Abstract
The article is devoted to the analysis of the semi-presidential, or mixed, model (system) of power. This structure is of a particular interest, not least due to the fact that it creates favorable conditions for the authoritarian evolution. Of course, an authoritarian regime can form in both the presidential and parliamentary systems, but the semi-p residential model holds much greater potential for such a development of events. The main flaw of the semi-presidential system is that the president is normatively placed above all institutions of power, but at the same time retains prerogatives that do not allow him to remain politically impartial. This position of the president in the system of power distorts his political self-identification. He begins to perceive himself as an analogue of an absolute monarch and monopolizes power via legal means. One of the fathers of the mixed model was Max Weber, whose idea of a plebiscitary president marked the beginning of the formation of a new type of a republican form of government, first enshrined in the Constitution of (Weimar) Germany in 1919. This is why the author thoroughly examines Weber’s concept, his role in the development of the Weimar Constitution, and compares his views with the normative model reflected in the Constitution. The article shows that although the Weimar Constitution did not adopt all of Weber’s principles and moved much further away from the model of a presidential republic, the main Weberian ideas were included in the form of certain norms. The final part of the article presents a number of critical considerations about certain provisions of the Weberian concept and the Weimar model of power.
Publisher
The Journal of Political Philosophy and Sociology of Politics