FORWARD-LOOKING PRINCIPLE IN REPEATED GAMES-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

FORWARD-LOOKING PRINCIPLE IN REPEATED GAMES

Published:2014-12 Issue:04 Volume:16 Page:1450011
ISSN:0219-1989
Container-title:International Game Theory Review
language:en
Short-container-title:Int. Game Theory Rev.

Author:

ARAMENDIA MIGUEL¹,WEN QUAN²

Affiliation:

1. BRiDGE group, Economia Aplicada IV, Universidad del Pais Vasco, Bilbao 48015, Spain

2. Department of Economics, University of Washington, Box 353330, Seattle, WA 98195-3330, USA

Abstract

In repeated games, equilibria requiring threats of punishment may be implausible if punishing a deviator hurts all the others. When all the punishers suffer from carrying out a punishment in the continuation, it would be in their best interest to forgive the deviation. Taking this line of reasoning into consideration, we introduce the forward-looking principle for subgame perfect equilibrium such that there must be, at least, one punisher who benefits in the continuation by carrying out the punishment. We show that this principle generally reduces payoffs that may arise from equilibrium. We characterize the payoffs that can be supported by subgame perfect equilibrium with forward-looking principle.

Publisher

World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt

Subject

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,Business and International Management,General Computer Science

Link

https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/S021919891450011X

Reference19 articles.

1. On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting

2. A Perspective on Renegotiation in Repeated Games

3. Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games

4. Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games

5. Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games