Affiliation:
1. Systems and Industrial Engineering Department, University of Arizona, PO Box 210020 Tucson, Arizona 85721, USA
Abstract
A stochastic bargaining process is first introduced to solve two-person conflicts. The outcome of the process depends on the initial offers of the two players, as well as on the offer-dependent breakdown probabilities. After the convergence (in most cases the finiteness of the process) is verified, a one-shot solution is introduced. The existence of a unique solution is then proven, and its relation to the non-symmetric Nash solution is discussed.
Publisher
World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt
Subject
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,Business and International Management,General Computer Science
Cited by
3 articles.
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