COMPROMISING IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES AND COOPERATION IN PERFECT EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

COMPROMISING IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES AND COOPERATION IN PERFECT EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES

Published:2006-09 Issue:03 Volume:08 Page:329-338
ISSN:0219-1989
Container-title:International Game Theory Review
language:en
Short-container-title:Int. Game Theory Rev.

Author:

FUKUDA E.¹,TIJS S. H.²,BRÂNZEI R.³,MUTO S.¹

Affiliation:

1. Department of Value and Decision Science, Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan

2. Center and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, The Netherlands

3. Faculty of Computer Science, 'Alexandru Ioan Cuza' University, Iasi, Romania

Abstract

In this paper reasonable payoff intervals for players in a game in partition function form (p.f.f. game) are introduced and used to define the notion of compromisable p.f.f. game. For a compromisable p.f.f. game a compromise value is defined for which an axiomatic characterization is provided. Also a generic subclass of games in extensive form of perfect information without chance moves is introduced. For this class of perfect extensive form games there is a natural credible way to define a p.f.f. game if the players consider cooperation. It turns out that the p.f.f. games obtained in this way are compromisable.

Publisher

World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt

Subject

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,Business and International Management,General Computer Science

Link

https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/S0219198906000941

Reference13 articles.

1. Notes on a new compromisw value: thex-value†

2. A set of axioms for a value for partition function games

3. The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities

4. The core of an economy with a common pool resource: A partition function form approach

5. Remarks on the reasonable set of outcomes in a general coalition function form game