TRANSFORMING GAMES FROM CHARACTERISTIC INTO NORMAL FORM-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

TRANSFORMING GAMES FROM CHARACTERISTIC INTO NORMAL FORM

Published:2007-03 Issue:01 Volume:09 Page:87-104
ISSN:0219-1989
Container-title:International Game Theory Review
language:en
Short-container-title:Int. Game Theory Rev.

Author:

GAMBARELLI GIANFRANCO¹

Affiliation:

1. Department of Mathematics, Statistics, Computer Science and Applications, University of Bergamo via dei Caniana 2, 24127 Bergamo, Italy

Abstract

A technique is proposed to represent games in characteristic function form as games in normal form, enabling the former to exploit the concepts of solution of the latter. A new solution for games in characteristic function form is then introduced and some properties are found. A generalization of a result of von Neumann and Morgenstern is thus obtained.

Publisher

World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt

Subject

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,Business and International Management,General Computer Science

Link

https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/S0219198907001291

Reference13 articles.

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2. Multilateral Bargaining Problems

3. Strategic claim games corresponding to an NTU-game

4. Common behaviour of power indices

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