GLOBAL STABILITY OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN AGGREGATIVE GAMES-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

GLOBAL STABILITY OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN AGGREGATIVE GAMES

Published:2014-12 Issue:04 Volume:16 Page:1450014
ISSN:0219-1989
Container-title:International Game Theory Review
language:en
Short-container-title:Int. Game Theory Rev.

Author:

OKUGUCHI KOJI¹,YAMAZAKI TAKESHI²

Affiliation:

1. Tokyo Metropolitan University, 1-1 Minami-Ohsawa, Hachioji-shi 192-0397, Japan

2. Department of Economics, Niigata University, 8050 Ikarashi 2-no-cho, Nishi-ku, Niigata-shi 950-2181, Japan

Abstract

If an aggregative game satisfies the generalized Hahn conditions, then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium which may not be interior and is globally asymptotically stable under two alternative continuous adjustment processes with non-negativity constraints.

Publisher

World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt

Subject

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,Business and International Management,General Computer Science

Link

https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/S0219198914500145

Reference25 articles.

1. The stability of the cournot oligopoly model: A reassessment

2. Existence of Cournot Equilibrium in Large Markets

3. Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements

4. Comparative statics for aggregative games the strong concavity case

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