EMISSION-MITIGATION-DRIVEN EXPORT TAX REBATE POLICY: AN EVOLUTIONARY GAME ANALYSIS

Author:

ZHOU ZHEN12,HUANG JIAPEI1,WANG XINKUN1,ZHANG RUINING234,LI HUI234,ZHAO CHENGAN1

Affiliation:

1. School of Management, Capital Normal University, Beijing 100089, P. R. China

2. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, P. R. China

3. School of Management and Economics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, P. R. China

4. Beijing Key Lab of Energy Economics and Environmental Management, Beijing 100081, P. R. China

Abstract

Export tax rebates are a common policy in global trade. With improvements to manufacturing techniques and economic development levels, export tax rebate policies are transitioning from being driven by economic objectives to being driven by environmental objectives through the alignment of export performance with environmental protection. However, existing studies lack the consideration of trade-offs between environmental objectives and economic objectives, and rarely analyze the relationship between production strategies of enterprises and export rebate rates. To formulate an efficient export tax rebate policy, an evolutionary game model is established to reveal the game relationship between the government and enterprises when export tax rebates with different policy goals are implemented. Furthermore, the impacts of export tax rebates on social welfare under different evolutionary strategies are analyzed. According to the results, enterprises fail to produce clean products in the case where economic objectives have priority. In the case where environmental objectives have priority, the output of clean products is directly related to the export tax rebate rate. In addition, the optimal tax rebate rate depends on the environmental benefits and the weights on the environmental and economic objectives. The innovation of this study lies in using the optimal dynamic response mechanism and the replication dynamic equation evolution mechanism to analyze the government-enterprise game problem in the export tax rebate mechanism according to different learning ability of the government and the enterprise. Meanwhile, we consider the influence of the weight of economic and environmental goals on both strategic choice and social welfare. The findings provide a valuable reference for designing and optimizing export tax rebate policies, especially for countries that implement export tax rebate policies and desire to improve the environment urgently.

Funder

National Natural Science Foundation of China

Publisher

World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd

Subject

Economics and Econometrics

同舟云学术

1.学者识别学者识别

2.学术分析学术分析

3.人才评估人才评估

"同舟云学术"是以全球学者为主线,采集、加工和组织学术论文而形成的新型学术文献查询和分析系统,可以对全球学者进行文献检索和人才价值评估。用户可以通过关注某些学科领域的顶尖人物而持续追踪该领域的学科进展和研究前沿。经过近期的数据扩容,当前同舟云学术共收录了国内外主流学术期刊6万余种,收集的期刊论文及会议论文总量共计约1.5亿篇,并以每天添加12000余篇中外论文的速度递增。我们也可以为用户提供个性化、定制化的学者数据。欢迎来电咨询!咨询电话:010-8811{复制后删除}0370

www.globalauthorid.com

TOP

Copyright © 2019-2024 北京同舟云网络信息技术有限公司
京公网安备11010802033243号  京ICP备18003416号-3